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This report presents the results of a Seed System Security Assessment in Zimbabwe, 
implemented during July 2009.   
 
A seed system security assessment (SSSA) reviews the functioning of seed systems which 
farmers use, both formal and informal.  It assesses whether seed of adequate quality is 
available and whether farmers can access it.  The approach also promotes strategic thinking 
about the relief, recovery or development vision needed.   For instance, during the stress 
period, should aid aim to restore the system as it was, ex ante, or aim to strengthen it?    A 
SSSA goes well beyond a conventional seed needs assessment as it hones in on specific seed 
security problems communities face, and then steers response to actions which alleviate 
specific constraints, and often improve systems. (For full description of method, see 
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/pdf/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf).     
 
Four sites were chosen for the assessment :  Murehwa , ward 14 (natural  region IIB); Bikita, 
ward 15,( natural  region III); Tsholotsho, ward 12 (natural  region IV); and Beitbridge, ward 
10 (natural region V). The sites include zones where participating non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) were prepared to address seed security-related constraints and 
opportunities.    The four selected sites also represent well the cross-section of the regions in 
which Zimbabwean agriculture and seed aid continue to unfold.   Murehwa is a prime maize 
zone in a higher potential region, Tsholotsho and Bikita are largely small grain zones, in which 
maize is also grown. Beitbridge is at the edge of where agriculture is viable.  
    
The full report presents the seed security findings and recommendations specific to each site,  
as well as findings and recommendations which emerged across sites.  In this summary, we 
focus on the across-site results as these may have broader relevance to areas in Zimbabwe 
where seed security responses are currently being planned. 
 
Note that this assessment coincided with a period when preparations by donors and NGOs 
were well advanced for distributing substantial seed (mainly hybrid maize) and fertilizer aid 
to at least 600,000 farming families, or about half of the Zimbabwe farming population.  At 
the same time, rural businesses, including agro-dealers that had closed shop during the price 
control enforcement, were beginning to revive. The synopsis of the findings are that (i) 
farmers are generally seed secure and have developed resilient community seed sourcing 
mechanisms during stress periods when seed was not available or affordable and that (ii) 
massive direct seed aid to farmers will hurt agro-dealers and ‘short circuit’ a natural business 
progression relationship between seed houses, agro-dealers, rural traders and the farmers. 
The team recognizes the need for assistance, particularly in terms of increasing farmer and 
community buying power and injecting currency into local economies.  However, we propose 
delivery mechanisms that give farmers the opportunity to choose (and strategize) and which 
that do not hurt rural business or agro-dealers and eventually hurt farmers – e.g. aid 
interventions such as vouchers and  subsidies for transport. These interventions require 
logistical prudence but are geared towards assisting the recovery process that has already 
begun.  Farming families depend on rural traders not only for seed and fertilizer purchases, 
but also as buyers for their farm produce.  
Select SSSA findings are summarized in the section directly below.  Recommendations then 
follow. 
 SEED SYSTEM SECURITY ASSESSMENT HIGHLIGHTS 
Smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe use both formal and informal seed channels for procuring 
their seed, and both merit explicit attention in any seed security assessment.   
Formal seed sector 
• Zimbabwe has been long known for having an unusually well developed national seed 
industry: when functioning well, over 15 companies produced and marketed seed of over 
20 different crops. (Key companies include SeedCo, Pannar, Pioneer, Agri Seeds, National 
tested Seeds.)    
• Maize is, by far, the most important focus of breeding and seed sector efforts and the 
only important food crop for which small farmers are dependent on the formal seed 
industry. Some 101 maize hybrid varieties were released in the period 1970-2007, and 8 
open pollinated varieties (OPVs) during the years 2003-2008.   Despite, increasing 
breeding efforts on OPVs, the Zimbabwe seed industry still focuses heavily on hybrids.  At 
the time of the SSSA, a single company, Agri Seeds, had OPVs (ZM521) on offer. 
• In the past, commercial seed companies have also sold seed of other crops, but these 
have been a minor focus relative to maize.  Some of the commercial crops for which seed 
has been previously sold include: wheat, barley, sunflower, soybeans and cotton.  Staple 
food crops for which seed of improved varieties was also previously sold include 
sorghum, peal millet, cowpeas and groundnuts.   
Trends pre-liberalization  
• Between 2006/07 and the beginning of 2009, the formal seed sector nearly shut down 
due to price controls, inflation  currency constraints, and an unfavorable policy/ 
regulatory environment.    Seed production within country was extremely limited, and 
essentially all retail seed outlets closed.  More specifically:  
o Seed companies had concerns about price.  Prices (especially for maize and 
wheat) were fixed by the government, which made it un-profitable for the out-
growers to produce seed and sell it to the companies.  There are also concerns 
that any seed produced could be requisitioned by government, at any time, to 
support large scale inputs distribution programs. 
 
o With land reform and the loss of the large-scale commercial farmers, seed 
companies have had to establish new networks of out-growers.  These new seed 
producers have required time to gain the necessary experience and expertise.  
They also farm much smaller amounts of land, which means seed companies 
have had to contract more growers, and this has significantly increased their 
transaction costs. 
 
o Before the introduction of the use of the US dollar, the inflationary environment 
made doing business in general extremely challenging. For example, the price of 
25 kgs of maize was 4313 Zimbabwe dollars  in  July 2003 and  250000000 
Zimbabwe dollars in  July 2008. 
 
 
 Current trends- with liberalization 
• With liberalization of the regulatory/policy environment and introduction of US$/ZAR 
(Rand) in the first quarter of 2009, most seed houses have been expanding grower 
networks and are re-opening retail outlets.   
o Seed houses have been significantly scaling up production in-country,  For 
instance, in the 2008/09 season, Pioneer produced at least 4000 mt of hybrids  
in-country , and  Agri Seeds between  5000 -6000 mt  (up from 1200 mt in 
2007/08).  It is not possible to get precise figures on total supplies available for 
the upcoming season, as:  a) seed companies prefer not to divulge figures on 
stocks now in country; and b) certified supplies for sale to Zimbabwe farmers can 
come from seed house branches in neighboring countries, particularly South 
Africa and to a lesser extent Zambia. Discussions with seed houses suggest that 
they can import very significant quantities with only 4-weeks’ notice.   
o Agro-dealers were open in every city, town and growth center visited during the 
assessment.  New outlets even opened during the course of the field assessment, 
indicating that the next few months could be a dynamic period of transition: e.g.  
a SeedCo outlet opened its doors in Murewha on July 10, 2009.  Anticipating 
expanded business, not only were agro-dealers selling seed and fertilizer, but so 
were general delivery stores, and many non-specialty shops, such as grocers and 
clothes stores, which would put 5-10 bags of inputs on offer.   
o The amount of stocks available for sale in July 2009 was impressive  for the time 
of year,  many months before sowing and well before  farmers’ main period seed 
purchases in September and October .  At that time, established agro-dealers had 
generally upwards of 15T maize for immediate sale, with the majority indicating 
that these were just initial stocks, which could be replenished when, or if, 
depleted.     
o Dealers generally assessed farmer buying patterns as quite positive.   In 
Masvingo, for example, Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS) had sold 8T maize 
immediately upon opening in March 2009, while N. Richards, had sold 15T in one 
week mid-July and had ordered another 15T to arrive the following week.   
Anticipating farmers’ limited access to US$ currency, dealers are making available 
smaller packets on inputs: two, and particularly five and 10kg packs of maize and 
fertilizer, along with the normal 20 and 25 kg packs.  
o Innovative efforts have been catalyzed to extend the reach of agro-dealers.  
Starting from 1995, CARE International in Zimbabwe has supported an 
‘Agribusiness Entrepreneur Network (AGENT) program, a network of community-
based agents which sell agri-inputs and allied products to smallholder farmers.   
The program has trained over 800 agents and at its height covered five provinces 
and 33 districts.  Basically, the work brings a network of retail shops much closer 
to its rural buyers.   Currently the program is active in Masvingo and the Midlands 
and has 106 trader agents.  CARE not only provides services to farmers through 
supporting such trader agents, but equally enhances agents’ own business skills, 
loan prospects and entrepreneurial opportunities.   
o Agro-dealers were optimistic but expressed concerns over staying open during 
this critical period. Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS), the largest agro-dealer in the 
province (Masvingo), provides a compelling example.  At its peak, MFS had 14 
branches and moved over 210T of maize seed  each season, serving over 100,000 
commercial and communal   farmers   with agricultural inputs.  August 2008, MFS 
 closed its doors and let all 150 employees go.  They re-opened March 2009, with 
15 staff only, but now have hopes for renewal. 
o Many dealers expressed dismay over the upcoming free direct seed distributions 
(DSD). Even if free seed  is provided only in November 2009,  hearing about the 
prospect of  such aid can change farmers’ buying patterns immediately---even 
five months earlier, in July 2009.   Evidence for such anticipatory behavior came 
from the Murehwa site, where in 2008/09, 50% of farmers in the district planted 
maize late, as they delayed sowing until the free fertilizer came, in mid December  
o In terms of  bolstering  agro-dealers,  two immediate  challenges became  
apparent during the SSSA; 
• To get inputs for  sale  into the regions, to agro-dealers  (versus only  
to centralized relief agencies procurers); 
• To encourage farmers to buy inputs now ,   knowing that free seed 
and fertilizer will be distributed in massive quantities later in the 
year.  
 
In brief, the formal seed sector in Zimbabwe has been very badly affected by the massive 
inflation that existed over the last 10 years, and by a very difficult economic and policy 
environment that prevailed during the same time period, and which has been particularly un-
favorable in the last three years.  However, in the first half of 2009 things have greatly 
improved (legalization of use of the US dollar for trade in-country and removal of restrictions 
on input and output markets).  Most of the major seed companies are also still functioning in 
Zimbabwe, albeit at much reduced levels compared with 10 years ago.  So there is now an 
important opportunity to re-establish the formal seed sector and related retail market 
networks in the country.  This potential recovery is still fragile, and needs to be encouraged 
with appropriate support.  The right kind of relief programs at this time – ones that promote 
rather than compete with the formal seed sector and retail networks – could be extremely 
valuable in jump-starting the recovery. 
 
Informal sector 
Sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts, cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sugar beans and sweet potato 
constitute the bulk of crops that are important in the informal seed sector in Zimbabwe.  
Others include open pollinated maize varieties, soybeans, sunflower, white beans and finger 
millet.    Except for maize, the informal sector supplies over 95% of the seed Zimbabwe 
farmers sow.    Informal sector crops are also are key for production stability and nutrition, 
and many are loosely identified as ‘women’s crops’.  Due to the collapse of the economy and 
the resultant shortage of maize seed in formal markets, hybrid maize has also made inroads 
into the informal markets. Hybrid maize bought in 10kg, 20kg, 25kg or 50kg packs is 
repackaged into smaller packets of 2kg and 5 kg and sold in the informal venue – from trucks 
or open market stalls, or from others who have obtained it, e.g. employees of some seed 
companies who were paid in seed bags, rather than currency.   
 
Overall, the assessment team found the informal sector function well: being both resilient 
and dynamic. There was an impressive amount of processing within communities, to add 
value to basic agricultural products and especially to generate income.  All major crops could 
potentially undergo transformation into saleable products. Also a number of processes have 
served to keep the informal sector dynamic and supplied with an injection of new varieties:  
 processes such as participatory variety selection, on-farm trials, cross-border trade, seed 
fairs.   
 
 
The 2008/09 season: overview  
• Informal sector supplies are abundant after the 2008/09 season.  
o The 2008-09 harvest was a good one, as assessed by all four farming 
communities, and supported by the Ministry of Agriculture Crop and Livestock 
Assessment Mission.  Following on a  ‘bad’ year,  maize production 2008-09 was 
160% more than that of 2007-08; and the 2008-09  combined  small grains was  
190% more than the previous year (and 110% more that the recent five-year 
national production average) (Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and 
Irrigation Development, 2009). 
o Social networks of exchange remain strong and continued to function during the 
2008-09 season, providing 10 to 38%   of the seed sown of maize, groundnut, 
finger millet, cowpea, sorghum, pearl millet and Bambara nut.   It is impressive 
that such extensive gift-giving took place, just after the ‘bad season of 2007-08.  
o Open markets in all sites visited had good supplies of a large variety of crops, 
many of which constitute ‘potential seed’.  Part of the abundance was   
attributed to a good harvest and part due to improved access to fuel and 
transport facilities which helped agricultural produce move.  Overall, the quality 
of potential seed on offer generally looked good to excellent: the legumes in 
particular were full grained, generally sorted to a single variety (except cowpea), 
free from inert material and with little evidence of damage in storage.    
• The big surprise in the informal sector was an abundance, not a lack. This abundance 
was most apparent where local level seed production has been given special 
technical and organizational support, particularly in the Tsholotsho region.  In 
Tsholotsho, Farmer Field Schools (FFS) produced 155 mt pearl millet, groundnut, 
sorghum and cowpea during the 2008/09 season   These FFS groups ask that outside 
agencies purchase their FFS-produced seed- rather than give outside seed aid.  While  
FFS groups have mastered the seed production techniques, they need help in 
identifying markets and to build their agro-business expertise more generally. 
The 2008/09 season: specific seed sources  
• Individual farmer assessments of the 2008/09season, showed the majority in the 
SSSA sample appreciated the varieties they sowed—and the seed condition.     
• In terms of seed sources for the 2008/09 season,  seed obtained  from farmers  own 
stocks or through social networks was key across crops; agro-dealers and local shops 
were  particularly important sources for maize seed, and local markets for the 
legumes, especially  groundnut and Bambara nut.  Development interventions were a 
significant seed source only for maize (13.6% of total seed supply) and much of this 
was obtained through the government program of Operation Maguta.   Within the 
SSSA sample, food aid and seed aid together provided just over  1/10 of the maize 
seed (and some of this was probably also Operation Maguta) .  Figures are 2.4% and 
8.1% for food aid and seed aid respectively.   
 
 In sum, farmers used a diversity of channels and multiple strategies to access their seed for 
the 2008/09 season: most involved use of their own local channels and even during this 
economically volatile period, farmers found ways to barter and buy at significant levels.  
Development and emergency aid together provided only a quarter of the total maize seed 
sown in 2008/09. 
 
Community Assessment of seed security  
and prospects for the 2009/10 season 
 
Community groups assessed their own seed security for their three most important crops (as 
prioritized by the community).  Seed security was defined as either having the seed already in 
hand, or being able to access the seed with some certainty (though purchase, barter, gift, or 
other).  
 
• Communities themselves were quite positive in their overall seed security 
assessment.  For small grain seed, all could meet 100% of their seed needs.   In two 
the four sites, communities signaled groundnuts as a potential problem for about a 
quarter of families, depending on the supplies to on  offer in open markets  at sowing 
time (and groundnut was the only crop for which communities signaled ongoing 
availability problems—due to challenges associated with its seed multiplication.)  The 
community assessment for maize seed security was very good: 90-100% of 
households have in stock or indicate they can access the seed they need, mainly 
through direct purchase.   
• Such community assessments correlated to a high degree with the quantitative 
findings from the 165 individual interviews.  In quantitative assessments , farmers 
indicated they had clear possibilities for obtaining 100% of their seed requirements 
for all crops, except for groundnut (in which they quantified they could reach 93% of 
their requirements)   
•  For the 2009/10 season farmers indicate they will use the following sources to obtain 
seed  
o For the small grains, farmers are counting mainly on their own stocks, 
supplemented by purchase at local markets.  For the legumes, again, home-
saved stocks and open markets will be used, with local markets being a main 
source particularly for Bambara nut. Cowpea, in Murehwa is an exception as 
the crop is relatively new and farmers still expect outside assistance from the 
NGO, World Vision especially for new varieties. 
o For maize, farmers have retained some stocks (recycled and carryover), but 
aim to purchase the bulk of the seed from agro-dealers: they sense such a 
strategy possible.  Farmers are optimistic they can obtain cash needed for 
maize purchase.   At the time of the assessment, it was not possible to 
confirm that all cash needed for maize purchase  by farming families was 
available as the sale of the 2008/09 crops was ongoing:  it is mainly from 
harvest sales that farmers expect to generate seed money.   
o Relatively few farmers are counting on emergency aid for seed for 2009/10.  
This could likely change as during the course of the assessment in July, 
newspapers were already starting to advertise the upcoming free 
distributions.  
 
 • Reviewing the overall evidence (qualitative and quantitative data), the SSSA team 
would be slightly more conservative than the community in assessing seed security.  
Particularly for maize, we would put figures of ‘maize needy’, at around 10% or a high 
of 15% , with the bulk of the  needy coinciding with those who are chronically poor. 
(So the issue would be purchasing power, not lack of seed per se.)     
This 10-15% figure for maize-related aid is based on a assumption that other farmers 
will have the opportunity to themselves acquire needed inputs.  This implies that 
input supplies of seed and fertilizer will continue to reach rural shops in important 
quantities. 
 
Fertilizer and costs of inputs 
Fertilizer assessments were not done extensively.  Communities themselves raised access to 
fertilizer rather than to maize seed per se, as the major constraint, mainly due to its unusually 
high cost 
• During the July 2009 assessment, fertilizer supplies were starting to be put in both 
agro-dealer and general delivery stores.  Neither agro-dealers nor farmers cited 
availability as a central issue with fertilizer.  Rather price was the compelling 
constraint and particularly the terms of trade.  Using barter economy rates, the price 
has gone up five-fold in but two to three years.  For instance, in Murehwa a 50kg bag 
used to cost 3 buckets of sweet potatoes; in July 2009, it cost the equivalent of 15 
buckets. 
• Quick calculations of costs of inputs give a sense of the current, exorbitantly high, 
costs of inputs—in relation to funds received for harvest sale.  Direct inputs to plant 
an acre of maize—only the seed and fertilizer—will cost the farmer at least $112 US.   




The overwhelming issues in terms of seed security—did not directly relate to seed at all.  The 
critical issues across sites revolved around money and purchasing power.  Prices for inputs 
were high, and farmers felt they were not getting adequate costs for their produce (which at 
the time of the assessment was just at the point of sale—to generate needed liquidity  
• The change to the new was welcomed by many as it has relatively stable value and 
help to stimulate the return of goods onto shelves.   
• However the move to the US$ has also brought a number of distinct disadvantages.  
As there is basically no change available (nothing under US$1), prices are being 
inflated up to the higher units.  Also, getting currency notes,  the FOREX, either to 
farmers individually, or into local commerce, has taken more time than will be 
expected.  Farmers also do not have an intrinsic sense of the currency and 
particularly how their produce should be valued in the new FOREX.   Even open 
market traders were quite unsure on how the currency change itself will affect prices  




 In brief: the issues related to money are multiple, and distinct. They include: 
 
• lack of actual currency notes  in rural areas (individually, and in commerce) 
• lack of change (small money) associated with the currency- which in itself 
leads to higher unit costs (as merchants round up) 
• lack of farmer purchasing power, especially in relation to low prices received 
for produce 
• Unfamiliarity with value of currency, including uncertainty of how the new 
notes in themselves will affect open market prices  
Seed security summary 
In terms of seed per se, the only critical issue found during the SSSA is related to formal seed 
and input sector functioning. Given the last few years of policy challenges (especially price 
control, and currency value breakdown), this sector will take time to recover.  However, even 
during the short period of the field SSSA, agro-dealers were starting to open their doors, 
general delivery dealers were starting to stock packets and even non-specialty stores (food 
stores, clothes shops) were starting to stack 5 and 10 bags here and there.  Evidence clearly 
shows that this sector is starting to put supplies on offer--and farmers already buying. One 
immediate challenge related to the formal sector supply, and specifically to agro-dealers, is to 
make sure they remain open and do not fold again. 
 
Fertilizer assessments were not done extensively.  Communities themselves raised access to 
fertilizer rather than to maize seed per se, as the major constraint, mainly due to its unusually 
high cost. SSSA team calculations reinforce the community assessment of the relatively high 
costs of production, and especially of fertilizer, in relation to remuneration received for maize 
sale.  
 
The SSSA found that the overriding problem around the issue of seed security, and the 
functioning of seed systems more broadly, had little to do directly with seed at all.  
Immediate and key constraints revolve around money and purchasing power: the terms of 
trade for farmers have escalated enormously; farmers  were just starting to market produce 
and were concerned about low remunerations ;  there is little actual cash (and particularly 
$US currency notes) in rural economies. 
 
As the next section moves toward making recommendations, we underline here the prime 
challenges for addressing seed security concerns at this highly fluctuating time in Zimbabwe: 
 
 To restart and reinforce  the formal sector supply—supporting not undermining 
fledging efforts; and   
 To inject cash into local economies 
 
These two big challenges should help shape immediate seed  security interventions across 
and within  the sites of assessment. 
 SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
A full set of recommendations appears in section VIII of this report.   Recommendations are 
divided into those for the very short term (now), versus recommendations for the short to 
medium term (i.e., within the next few seasons).   In this summary, we focus on 
recommendations specific to formal and informal seed sector functioning, and to methods of 
seed security assessment. 
 
Formal Seed Sector Strengthening During Emergency and Early 
Recovery 
 
Agro-dealers are critical conducts through which farmers obtain maize seed, fertilizer and 
other specialized agricultural inputs.  They can only serve small farmers if: a) they continue to 
exist, b) have supplies,  c) are situated in some proximity to farming communities, and d) 
offer products at prices which farmers can afford.   The Relief Seed Business is threatening to 
compromise attributes a  and b, and incentives or subsidies have to be put in place to address 
issues c and d.  
 
Very short term 
 
6. Recommendation:  In the immediate months, all efforts must be made to sustain,  
 not undermine, agro-dealer business during this tenuous financial period.  A good 
 number are just starting to re-open their doors, and it is a ‘make or break’ period for 
 them. 
   
Specific recommendations linked to 6 
  
 6.1  If emergency maize and/or fertilizer are to be given as part of relief programs 
  such distributions should be done via a  voucher system linking farmers to 
  agro-dealers stores or to agro-dealers selling at seed fairs.    
  
  Such a move will help support business recovery, get farmers access to  
  preferred varieties and inputs, and help to inject cash into the local economy. 
  
 6.2 Agro-dealers need to be encouraged to sell closer to farming communities, 
  and growth center areas.  Transport costs mean that rural farmers may pay 
  30-50% more for the same bag of seed sold in the bigger towns.  In the short-
  term, aid organizations might consider adding a transport cost into any  
  voucher program. 
 
 6.3 Agro-dealers linked to seed aid programs should be encouraged to package 
  seed and fertilizer products in sizes farmers have potential to access.  While 
  the assessment team saw 1 kg packages of both (re-packed) we suggest 
  seed sizes of  5 and 10 kg (with 2 kg on offer in small quantity) and fertilizer 
  in 5 and 10 kg packs and upwards. 
 
 6.4  Efforts should be made (by donors? government? UN agencies?) to ensure 
  that regional and local agro-dealers can receive adequate stocks to sell.  This 
  might be an issue of reorienting the overall supply away from bulk relief  
   aid purchase.  Mechanisms should also be explored for helping local dealers 
  to receive stocks on consignment or through some credit guarantee  
  arrangement. 
 
Short to medium term 
 
7. Recommendation: The ‘normal’ network of those selling certified maize seed, 
fertilizer, and other specified inputs needs to be expanded and brought closer to 
farming communities on a continued basis.  Formal agro-dealers may not find it 
lucrative to set up shop in less populated and removed areas. Programs such as 
CARE’s ‘trader agents’ in Masvingo have served in the past to broaden agro-supplier 
coverage. (Note: similar programs have unfolded in neighboring Zambia, The Profit 
Program)   Recommendation: The traders agent networks, such as those supported 
by CARE,  should re-vitalized and replicated so as to serve even those in more remote 
areas.  
 
8. As a general recommendation, across the board:, Incentives need to be put in place 
to encourage agro dealers and trader agent suppliers to become more  small farmer 
client oriented.  Client-oriented means putting seed on offer early (July/August rather 
than October/November), offering farmers preferred crops varieties and fertilizers, 
packing in affordable sizes, and selling at points accessible to local farming 
populations.  
  
INFORMAL SEED SECTOR STRENGTHENING DURING 
EMERGENCY AND EARLY RECOVERY 
 The informal seed sector provides the majority of Zimbabwe farmers’ seed:  small 
grains, pulses and tubers. (Important exceptions are seed of maize, wheat and 
horticultural crops).  The informal sector needs to be strengthened so as to provide 
farmers easy access to improved varieties, deliver a good quality seed, and to 
professionalize the processes of seed production, marketing and rural agro-
enterprise more generally.   A healthier informal seed sector will translate into a 
much healthier rural economy. 
 
 
Very short term 
 
9. Recommendation: emergency support programs linking with the informal as well as 
formal sector should concentrate on alleviating seed access problems. Seed fairs with 
vouchers, vouchers linking farmers to agro-dealers  (cited in point 7) and direct cash 
transfers are all examples of possible aid options which might give farmers increased 
access to crops and varieties of their choice. 
 
Specific recommendations linked to 9 
 
9.1 In terms of seed-related issues, seed voucher and fair operations might best  
 be designed to respond to specific needs of farmers at this moment in time.   
 Access to groundnut seed, and seed of new, especially early maturing 
 varieties, have been cited at various sites as key farmer-sought inputs.   Seed 
 fairs might make extra efforts to engage local and regional agro-dealer 
  suppliers to put on offer modern varieties.  Formal sector suppliers might 
 require a transport premium to take part in these rural  events. 
 
9.2.  Non-seed agricultural inputs also were cited at the forefront of farmer needs 
 in the assessment:  fertilizer, labor, draught power.   Seed fairs might insure 
 that both basal and top dressing fertilizer bags appear on offer in any fair 
 event, and in farmer-friendly sizes.  Use of vouchers to gain access to labor 
 and draught power might also be explored. 
 
9.3   Graduated vouchers might be usefully employed in the upcoming emergency 
 programs.  Basically, graduated vouchers give varied levels of aid and help to 
 distinguish between the very poor, and  those who need a bit of extra help in 
 this time of financial and currency fluctuation. Graduated vouchers can  help 
 lessen  dependencies, as only  those near the bottom of the spectrum 
 should  receive substantial free  support. Average income farmers (again, 
 somewhat cash insecure) might receive vouchers to cover but parts of their 
 agricultural needs. 
 
9.4.  Giving cash aid as direct assistance might seem unwise at this point in 
 Zimbabwe, where the whole economy is severely cash-strapped.  However, 
 small cash trials could help farmers access their own priority needs, which 
 may include agricultural inputs. 
  
Short to medium term 
 
There is a strong need and opportunity to professionalize and strengthen informal sector 
seed production. 
 
10. Farmer groups (and individual entrepreneurs)  require support to ensure good quality 
seed supplies of what are referred to as the non-commercial or orphan crops  
(basically everything but maize, wheat and horticultural crops). This support implies 
efforts on multiple thrusts, and needs to be done professionally.  Seed production 
will not succeed unless it is tied to real demand and sustainable market development.  
Recommendation:  Significant effort and funds should be allotted to increase 
informal seed production capacity and marketing channels.    
   
 Specific recommendations linked to 10 
 
10.1 Local community groups need enhanced capacity in the techniques of seed 
 production.  Farmer Field School experience shows that better isolation 
 distances, variety sorting, improved agronomic practices, improved storing 
 and storage techniques can lead to greater availability of good quality seed at 
 the local level. Groundnut seed, in particular, requires  enhanced local level 
 capacities. 
 
10.2 Farmer groups, whether for seed or food sale, should only be encouraged to 
 produce crops if  clear markets have been identified, and general agro-
 enterprise/ marketing skills enhanced.  Market skill enhancement and 
 market identification has to be the driving force shaping local production 
 initiatives.   
 
 10.3 New, modern, farmer-acceptable, and market preferred crops and varieties 
 have to feed on a continuing basis into local production systems, both to 
 boost yields and enhance marketing possibilities.  Across sites, only new 
 maize  varieties enter  farming system with regularity—except when special 
 aid of development programs bring  in new cowpea or sweet potato or pearl 
 millet types.   Recommendation: Links have to be professionalized and 
 sustained to promote variety innovation at the local level.   Farmer Field 
 Schools (FFS),  Participatory Variety selection, new variety small packet sales 
 might all help to raise awareness of and access to new needed varietal 
 materials.  
 
 10.4 Production of foundation seed has to be intensified across of range of non-
  commercial crops, to form the base of an extensive, decentralized, seed  
  production system.  The production of such foundation seed should squarely 
  rest with the national research institution `DR&SS.  (This is not an appropriate 
  or sustainable international agricultural center function).   
 
In brief, we are recommending the development of a market driven local seed 
production model, which scales up foundation seed and then decentralizes seed 
production in scores of zones country- wide.  Supply has to respond to demand, 
meaning that hard to produce crops (e.g. groundnut) and new desired varieties have 
to drive the production process. 
 
11. Local markets are important for farmers’ seed supply, particularly for the pulses. 
More attention should be given to encouraging that these open seed/grain markets 
supply the kinds of potential seed farmers need.  As a point of departure, seed/grain 
traders could be powerful partners in helping to move new modern varieties widely, 
within and among farming communities.  Recommendation:  Strategies should be 
tested for directly linking formal sector seed supply with informal trader seed/grain 
sellers.  Among the approaches that might be tested and evaluated are a) the 
distribution of variety samples (to stimulate demand); and b)  the sale of small 
packets of modern varieties and improved seed at open market venues. 
 
PROMOTING ACCURATE SEED SYSTEM SECURITY 
ASSESSMENTS 
  
 Classic seed need assessments inevitably conclude that ‘seed is needed’ and that the 
response should take the form of direct seed distribution. While innovative at their inception 
(as they distinguished seed aid need from food aid need), such assessments are now 
outdated, inadequate and should be significantly modified, and urgently. Understanding of 
what happens to seed systems during disaster has become markedly more refined in the last 
five years and   we have learned that distinguishing among seed security constraints is key for 
recovery.  Further, analyses have shown that systems need to be analyzed to gear 
appropriate seed-related responses: seed systems, farming systems, markets and livelihood 
systems more generally. 
 
Short to medium term 
 
12. Recommendation:  Seed security assessment methods have to be significantly revamped. 
  
Specific recommendations linked to 12. 
 
 12.1  ` National and regional formats for assessing seed security status should shift  
 from those which calculate simplistic ‘seed needs’ to frameworks which 
 recognize different types of seed security problems, and which tailor 
 responses accordingly.  These problems might include diverse constraints of 
 seed availability, seed access and seed quality, which are distinguished by 
 their presence in the short and in the long term.   The Crop and Food 
 Assessments missions might be among the priority tools to be revised to 
 contain a specific seed security component. 
 
 12.2 Seed security assessment capacity needs to be built at regional and local 
 levels.   Technical tools already exist to help NGO and government 
 agricultural officials move forward on seed security assessments.   An explicit 
 technical process needs to be put in place to: 
• raise awareness of seed security versus food security issues 
• set up local level seed security indicators 
• train local level staff (NGO and government)  in seed security field 
assessments  
 
 12.3  Given the complexity of the stresses in Zimbabwe, “emergency’ seed aid 
  related work has to think strategically and longer-term. Assessments  
  related to seed security, can and should incorporate more developmental 
   elements, including  Issues related  to system stability, opening and   
  strengthening of markets, and  equity concerns. 
   
 This expanded focus suggests that the ‘skill set of those assessing seed 
 security’ has  to be considerably broadened.  Minimally SSSA requires 
 inputs from formal and  informal seed sector specialists, farming system 
 specialists, marketing professionals, and gender/ livelihood analysts.  
 Nutritional expertise might be considered as an  added bonus.   
  
  Specific recommendation: Multidisciplinary teams should be mobilized for 
  seed system security assessments.    
 
 12.4 More generally, a political environment for ‘real seed security assessment’ 
 has to be established.  This is no easy task.  Technical advances in methods 
 alone will not lead to more accurate assessments. 
 
Strong seed security frameworks at a national level and strong leadership, ensuring that seed 
security assessment is given focus (as distinct from food security and other non-food item 
assessment),  can enable seed aid assistance in Zimbabwe to become more demand and 
problem driven.  More accurate assessments will bolster the ability of seed-related assistance 
to address farmers’ compelling seed security problems and to seize on important, emerging 
opportunities.  
